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1. Introduction 
 
The Chairman of the World Trade Organizations (WTO) agriculture negotiations, the New Zealand 
ambassador Crawford Falconer, and the Chairman of the non-agricultural market access (NAMA) 
negotiations, the Canadian ambassador Don Stephenson, issued drafts on modalities on February 8, 
2008. These drafts present the latest attempt to combine the positions of the WTO member 
countries on the salient elements in the negotiations into a compromise proposal from which the 
talks towards a final agreement can proceed. 
 
Originally, the declaration from Doha that launched the present round of trade negotiations, 
November 14, 2001, stipulated that modalities within agriculture were to be agreed upon no later 
than March 31, 2003. As is apparent, agreement on modalities were not reached by that date. The 
Cancun ministerial conference in September 2003 ended abruptly without consensus. Nevertheless, 
at August 1, 2004, an agreement concerning the framework for modalities was reached along with 
an extension of the initial deadline, January1, 2005, for the Doha round of negotiations. Although 
not specifically a modalities agreement this so-called “July framework package” contained an over-
all outline of future more detailed reduction commitments. In Hong Kong, December 2005, the 
ministerial declaration presented a new imminent deadline for modalities for both agriculture and 
NAMA to be April 20, 2006. Nonetheless, this deadline also turned out to be too ambitious. Against 
this background, the new attempt at compromise proposals presented imbues some hope into the 
negotiations that an agreement might eventually be reached. 
 
Although the Doha negotiations have been in a state of limbo for several years, agricultural policies 
have developed. Particularly, the European Union has reformed its domestic support regime 
considerably and promised to phase out export subsidies by 2013. The mid-term review of the EU 
agricultural policy from 2003 converted hectare and animal premiums into single farm payments, 
and thereby removed most of EU domestic support from the blue box and transferred it to the 
allowed green box category. Along with the promise to phase out export subsidies two major areas 
of contention in the Doha negotiations have been settled at least from the European view. In spite of 
this fairly comprehensive reform towards more decoupled support developing countries in general 
consider the over-all amount of agricultural support in developed countries to be a focal issue in the 
negotiations. It can be argued that no support is entirely decoupled and will have some albeit small 
effect on production decisions, wherefore even green box support should be disciplined to some 
extent. Nevertheless, the distance between the EU and developing countries in general on domestic 
support and export subsidies has been reduced considerably. The US, on the other hand, that has 
upheld a fairly liberal position hitherto in the negotiations seem to be moving in the opposite 
direction with the Farm Bill 2008 underway through Congress. Nevertheless, the EU with it’s 
insistence on the right to designate as much as 4-6% of tariff lines as sensitive shows reluctance in 
offering substantial concessions on the much contested issue of market access. This position, 
however, is reciprocated by the big fast-growing economies of the developing world that displays a 
like stern aversion towards relaxing their considerable entry barriers for NAMA products. 
 
The present state of affairs in the WTO can be characterised as a stale-mate where the major 
players, the EU, the USA, Brazil and India backed up by various countries each seem intend on not 
admitting any substantial concessions fearing they might not get similar concessions from the other 
side. The EU and the US demand more open access to particularly the countries with large and fast-
growing economies, specifically China, India and Brazil. The latter countries, however, insist that 
the EU and the US show a genuine will towards opening up for agricultural imports. Furthermore, 
even the big fast-growing economies demand quite comprehensive Special and Differential 
Treatment (SDT) in line with the other developing countries, a demand that has made the 
negotiations in the Trade and Development committee under the WTO where SDT negotiations are 
meant to take place very difficult. Likewise, the process towards increased trade among developing 
countries themselves is not showing any significant signs of progress. The south-south trade debate 
is to a large extent clouded by the discussions between the developed countries and the big middle-
income countries. In short, the EU and the US are prepared to concede quite extensive SDT 
provisions for poor African and Asian economies but are not willing to let China, India and Brazil 
obtain the same. 
 
The consequences of not reaching an agreement in the WTO negotiations are already apparent. 
Countries all over the world are increasingly forming bilateral and regional trade arrangements. 
This can only lead to a more bureaucratic and non-transparent international trade regime to the 
detriment of all countries but in particular developing countries. Furthermore, how disputes are 
settled within these numerous trading arrangements are not at all clear, whereas one of the major 
benefits of the WTO is the legal system known as the Dispute Settlement Mechanism where 
conflicts can be arbitraged and eventually adjudicated. In fact, the WTO is one of the more apparent 
successes in the arena of international cooperation. And it would be a major loss and to the 
detriment of all countries if the WTO becomes more and more peripheral due to the inability of the 
members to reach an agreement and due to the prevalence of a range of other trading arrangements. 
 
 
2. The Falconer Draft 
 
Ambassador Falconer, Chairman of the Special Session of the Committee on Agriculture, issued a 
text on modalities for agriculture February 8, 2008. The intention of the text is to outline the room 
within which the Chairman sees the WTO member’s positions in the negotiations are placed. 
Subsequently, the text is intended to alleviate the negotiations by focusing and narrowing the 
discussions around the contended issues. 
 
 
Domestic support 
 
In the July framework package an agreement was reached regarding the formula to be used for 
reducing domestic support. Trade-distorting support is to be reduced according to a tiered formula. 
However, the required cuts in each tier have yet to be agreed upon. The Falconer Draft stipulates 
cuts. A new WTO term, on top of the quite numerous other specific WTO terms, is defined called 
OTDS (Overall Trade-Distorting Domestic Support), which consists of Aggregate Measure of 
Support (AMS), de minimis and blue box or put differently, the amber plus the blue box. The 
reduction schedules for each of the three tiers are proposed be either of the following alternatives: 
 
a) 75-85% for OTDS greater than 60 billion US $ 
b) 66-73% for OTDS greater than 10 billion US $ 
c) 50-60 % for OTDS greater less than 10 billion US $ 
 
For developing countries SDT provisions advocated in the Draft are required to undertake two-
thirds of the reductions. However, several country groups are now recognised as not required to 
undertake any reductions. These are: 
 
i) Developing country members with no Final Bound Total AMS commitments 
ii) Net food-importing countries 
iii) Very Recently-Acceded Members 
iv) Small low-income Recently Acceded Members 
v) Least-Developed Countries 
 
Final Bound Total AMS are also scheduled for reductions according to a tiered formula: 
a) AMS greater than 40 billion US $ is reduced by 70 % 
b) AMS greater than 15 billion US $ is reduced by 60 % 
c) AMS less than 15 billion US $ is reduced by 45 % 
 
The SDT provisions for developing country members are the same as under OTDS. Thus, the same 
country groups are recognised as being exempted from any reductions in AMS 
 
Furthermore, the SDT provisions for both OTDS and AMS also allow for longer implementation 
periods for developing countries. 
 
Provisions for Blue Box support now comes in two categories (a) and (b). Each member country is 
required to select one category for which all of its Blue Box support must comply. Blue Box (a) 
contains direct payments under production-limiting programmes and Blue Box (b) contains direct 
payments that do not require production. Permitted Blue Box support is limited to 2.5% of the value 
of agricultural production in the base period. However, for members that has placed more than 40% 
of its trade-distorting support in the Blue Box in the base period (e.g. Norway), the Blue Box 
support shall be reduced equivalently with the percentage reduction in the member’s AMS. 
Furthermore, product-specific limits are introduced for Blue Box support with special provisions for 
the US. In all, the Blue Box paragraph in the Draft gives the impression that this point is quite 
contested and with some distance between members’ positions. 
 
For Cotton, specifically, the Draft proposes a specific formula for reducing support, which ensures 
quite a substantial reduction. 
 
Overall, the reduction commitments appear to be fairly ambitious for specifically developed 
countries. However, most of the trade-distorting support has been reformed quite comprehensively 
since the end of the Uruguay Round. Thus, the resulting reductions on applied support today will be 
quite small. For instance, the EU that used to have a very large support under the Blue Box  and 
also Amber box category has moved this support to the Green Box through reform efforts. Thus, 
most if not all EU support is exempt from reduction commitments. For the US, much depends on 
the reform of the Farm Bill. However, the current status on the Farm Bill negotiations does not 
point unequivocally towards a more liberal direction. 
 
Market Access 
 
The Market access reduction suggestions likewise follow the tiered formula approach. The 
reduction commitments fall in four tiers: 
 
a) Final bound tariffs greater than 0 and less than 20 % (30% for developing countries) 
are reduced by 48-52% (2/3 of this cut for developing countries) 
b) Final bound tariffs greater than 20 % (30% for developing countries) and less than 
50 % (80% for developing countries) are reduced by 55-60% (2/3 of this cut for 
developing countries) 
c) Final bound tariffs greater than 50 % (80% for developing countries) and less than 
75 % (130% for developing countries) are reduced by 62-65% (2/3 of this cut for 
developing countries) 
d) Final bound tariffs greater than 75 % (130% for developing countries) are reduced 
by 66-73% (2/3 of this cut for developing countries) 
 
Furthermore, a minimum overall average cut is introduced at 54% for developed countries and a 
maximum required 36 % reduction for other countries. Again several specific country groups are 
recognised that are exempt or only required to make moderate cuts. 
 
Concerning the debated issued of sensitive products it is suggested that developed countries are 
given the right to designate 4-6% of tariff lines as sensitive or where a member have more than 30% 
of it’s tariff lines in the top band up to 6-8%. Reduction commitments for sensitive products are 
reduced from the tiered formula with up to two-thirds. Developing countries are given the right to 
increase the number of sensitive products with one-third. 
 
The TRQ (Tariff Rate Quota) system introduced in the Uruguay round is aimed at providing new 
access opportunities of 4-6% of domestic consumption for developed countries. Furthermore, the 
TRQ access is increased equivalently for products designated as sensitive and dependent upon the 
tariff reduction chosen for the sensitive product. Overall, the paragraph on TRQs shows that this 
issue is contested and quite detailed and complex conditionalities are needed for various TRQ 
provisions. SDT is introduced for developing countries and for subsistence production. 
 
The market access paragraph also contains a number of other issues: 
 
- Tariff escalation with a formula that is applied to a list of products and other detailed 
provisions conditional on a number of factors 
- Tariff simplification with a general rule of not introducing more complex tariffs and having 
at least 90% of bound tariffs in ad valorem form 
- In-quota tariff reduction commitments 
- Tariff quota administration simplification 
- Special safeguard mechanism reduced or eliminated for developed countries 
- Special products designated by developing countries based on indicators concerning food 
security, livelihood and rural development 
- Higher tariff reductions for tropical and diversification products 
- No tariff cuts for 10 years for preference products 
- Free access for Cotton exports from LDCs 
 
The Market Access paragraph is the most complex issue left in the negotiations, which is made 
abundantly clear by the paragraph in the Falconer Draft. Quite a large number of deviations from 
the general rules are apparently needed both in terms of different country group exemptions and 
also product exemptions. The Falconer Draft presents various lists of products that are applied for 
different articles. The Chairman has apparently found that an agreement on general rules applicable 
to all WTO member countries is not achievable in the area of market access. Hopefully, the 
increased complexity of a probable agreement outlined in the Draft serves to ensure that an 
agreement is actually reached. 
 
 
Export Competition 
 
The previously much contested issue of export subsidies appears to have been settled. This 
paragraph in the Falconer Draft is quite short and with clear and general provisions with very few 
exceptions. Export subsidies are to be phased out. The issues of Export Credits, State Trading 
Enterprises and Food Aid are subjected to comply with specific provisions. 
 
General conclusion 
 
The Draft provides a bold effort at summarising and outlining the position of the members. But it 
also makes clear that much work is still needed by the negotiators. Just counting the number of 
brackets, which indicate items not agreed upon, reach a total of 229 in the Falconer Draft. 
Nevertheless, the Draft can hopefully serve as a point of departure in the ensuing negotiations and 
the concrete formulation of the contested issues can help focusing the negotiators efforts. Although 
some issues still remains to be agreed upon concerning the area of domestic support, the Draft text 
on the area of market access vividly shows that the most controversial issues remain within this 
field. 
 
 
3. Model analysis 
 
 
This section presents the outcome of a quantitative analysis on the countries of the world as a 
consequence of the revised draft modalities for agriculture and non-agricultural market access in 
terms of macroeconomic, trade and distributional effects. 
 
 
The GTAP analysis 
 
Model, database and Doha scenario 
 
The economic analysis is based on an economic model of the world economy with particular 
emphasis on global trade and production covering 38 different product categories (of which 12 are 
primary agricultural products and 8 are processed food products) in 39 countries/regions. The 
starting point of the analysis is the so-called Global Trade Analysis Projects (GTAP) database and 
model. The database is the most recent Version 6 GTAP database with the base year 2001 
(Dimaranan et al., 2005), where the 2001 tariff data originating from the Market Access Maps 
(MacMap) HS6 database has been used with some verification and minor modifications.  
Like any applied economic model, this model is, of course, based on assumptions, both in terms of 
theoretical structure as well as the specific parameters and data used. Regional production is 
generated by a constant return to scale technology in a perfectly competitive environment, and the 
private demand system is represented by a non-homothetic demand system (a Constant Difference 
Elasticity function)2. The foreign trade structure is characterized by the Armington assumption 
implying imperfect substitutability between domestic and foreign goods.3 
The global database combines detailed bilateral trade, transport and protection data characterising 
economic linkages among regions, together with individual country input-output databases which 
account for intersectoral linkages within regions. The applied ad valorem equivalents (AVEs) tariff 
data found in the standard GTAP Version 6 databases originate from the Market Access Maps 
(MacMap) database, which is compiled from UNCTAD TRAINS data, country notifications to the 
WTO, AMAD, and from national customs information. The MacMap database contains bound, 
Most Favoured Nation (MFN) and bilateral applied tariff rates (both specific and ad valorem) at the 
6-digit Harmonised Systems (HS6) level which are aggregated to GTAP concordance using trade 
weights compiled from the COMTRADE database.  
 
Updating the database 2001 – 2015 
 
                                                 
2 Hence the present analysis abstracts from features such as imperfect competition and increasing return to scale, which 
may be important in certain sectors. We are therefore using what can be thought of as a base GTAP structure. 
3 The macroeconomic closure is a neoclassical closure where investments are endogenous and adjust to accommodate 
any changes in savings. This approach is adopted at the global level, and investments are then allocated across regions 
so that all expected regional rates of return change by the same percentage. Although global investments and savings 
must be equal, this does not apply at the regional level, where the trade balance is endogenously determined as the 
difference between regional savings and regional investments. This is valid as the regional savings enter the regional 
utility function. The quantity of endowments (land, labour and natural resources) in each region is fixed exogenously 
within the model, although. The capital closure adopted in the model is based on the theory where changes in 
investment levels in each country/region become on-line instantly, updating the capital stocks endogenously in the 
model simulation3. Finally, the numeraire used in the model is a price index of the global primary factor index. 
The GTAP database version 6 uses 2001 as the base year. A number of important developments 
have taken place since then or are planed for the immediate future preceding implementation of a 
Doha round. In order not to attribute the effect of such developments to the Doha round scenario 
analysed in this paper, we update/project the database from 2001 to the year 2015, by conducting a 
“presimulation” that involves implementing the assumptions listed in Box 1 below. We then take 
the resulting data set from the presimulation as the base for our Doha analysis. 
 
 
Box 1. Assumptions used to update/project the database to 2015. 
 
Projections of the world economy from 2001 to 2015 
• Regional GDP, capital, labor force and population growth together with regional specific total 
factor productivity increases. 
 
Trade policy changes (updating initial 2001 tariff structure) 
• Final implementation of the UR commitments for developing countries; 
• Accession of China to the WTO; 
• Enlargement of the EU customs union to include 12 new members; 
• Changing the applied tariffs face by the new EU member countries in non-members countries to 
EU rates; 
• Extension of the EFTA agreement to include 12 new member countries; 
• Everything But Arms (EBA) Agreement between LDCs and the EU27; 
• The implementation of the TDCA agreement between South Africa and the EU27 
• The implementation of the AGOA on textiles and wearing apparel; 
• An update of Indian’s applied MFN tariff rates to the latest year available; 
• Final implementation of the NAFTA agreement; 
• Abolishment of export quotas on textiles and wearing apparel; 
 
Domestic policy changes 
• A stylized implementation of the Mid-Term Review Reform of the CAP’s, decoupling of direct 
payments to a single farm payment in the EU27; 
• No sugar and milk quotas in the EU27 
• EU CAP budgetary expenditure fixed in nominal terms 
• USA agricultural subsidies (expenditure) fixed in nominal terms at its 2001 level 
 
 
Doha assumptions 
 
The Doha analysis in this paper involves both modalities for agriculture and Non-Agricultural 
Market Access (NAMA). The simulation undertaken follow the revised draft modalities outlined in 
the two papers published by the negotiating group on market access and the committee on 
agriculture special session. 
 
 
Agriculture 
In the agricultural case, we use the tiered market access formula allowing developed countries take 
out six percent of their tariff lines as sensitive products while developing countries are allowed to 
exclude eight percent of their tariff lines at the Hs6 digit level (Table 1)4.  
 
 
Table 1: Reductions in final bound tariffs 
Developed countries Tariff cut (%) Developing countries Tariff cut (%) 
 
Tariff rate (%) 
 6% 
sensitive 
 
Tariff rate (%) 
 8% 
sensitive 
Greater than 75 70.0 35.0 Greater than 130 46.6 23.3 
Between 50.01 and 75 65.0 32.5 Between 80.01 and 130 43.3 21.6 
Between 20.01 and 50 60.0 30.0 Between 30.01 and 80 40.0 20.0 
From 0 to 20 50.0 25.0 From 0 to 30 33.0 16.6 
Min. average cut 54%   Max. average cut 36%   
 
Sensitive products are reduced by one-half of the reduction that otherwise would have been required 
by the tiered formula. We implement this sensitivity rule assuming that the tariff lines with the 
highest applied rates are most sensitive and therefore the ones chosen to have there bound rates 
reduced at the lower one-half cut rate5.  
 
In the revised draft modalities for agriculture the 151 WTO members are divided into five different 
classes of countries each with different reduction commitments. In the analysis undertaken in this 
paper we have implemented the following reduction commitments for these groups of countries:  
 
Developed countries: 
• Reduced bound tariffs using the tiered formula shown in Table 1 above 
• Six percent sensitive products reduced by one-half of the rate which otherwise would be 
required. 
• Tropical products listed in Annex G of the revised draft modalities for agriculture are reduced 
by 85 per cent if the ad valorem tariff is above 25 per cent or else they are reduced to zero if 
the tariff is equal to or below 25 percentage points. There are no sensitive product treatments 
for these products appearing on the annexed list6. 
• Less developed countries are granted duty and quota free access. 
 
Developing countries 
• Reduced bound tariffs using the tiered formula shown in Table 1 above. 
• Eight percent sensitive products reduced by one-half of the rate which otherwise would be 
required. 
 
Small Vulnerable Economies 
                                                 
4 The HS6 nomenclature is an international standard for classifying products into aggregated product groups. The 
classification scheme contains about 5000 product groups, is maintained by the World Customs Organization (WCO) 
and is used for specifying tariff schedules. 
5 There are of course many other ways to chose sensitive product at the HS 6 digit level. 
6 In the case of rice and processed rice tariffs into Japan and Korea, these are not reduced in the model simulations. This 
is because these are prohibitive tariffs between 500 – 1000 percentage points. Reducing these tariffs in the model would 
overstate the impact these cuts would have because they are well above the lowest tariff rate that would drive imports to 
zero.  
• Reduced bound tariffs using the tiered formula shown in Table 1 for developing countries but 
with the cuts moderated by 10 ad valorem percentage points in each band. Eight percent 
sensitive products. 
 
Recently Acceded members 
• Reduced bound tariffs using the tiered formula shown in Table 1 for developing countries but 
with the cuts moderated by 7.5 ad valorem percentage points in each band. Eight percent 
sensitive products 
• Recently acceded members, Saudi Arabia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
Vietnam, Tonga, Albania, Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova and Jordan do not 
make any cuts in bound rates. 
 
Less developed countries 
• Make no reductions in bound tariffs. 
• Gain duty and quota free access into the develop country markets. 
 
Note that among other things we have not included in the analysis the expansion of tariff rate quotas 
or checked if the minimum, maximum average cut requirements are fulfilled. 
 
With regard to agricultural export subsidies we have reduced all export subsides found in the GTAP 
database to zero, while there is no change to domestic support in our Doha scenario. The MTR 
reform of the CAP has already taken place and further reductions in the domestic support in other 
countries is assumed to be done by reducing administered prices without any real effect on trade.  
 
NAMA 
In the Non Agricultural Market Access reform we use the simple Swiss formula with coefficients 8 
and 20 for respectively developed and developing countries, including newly acceded members. 
Developing countries and newly acceded countries are allowed to exclude up to five percent of their 
tariff lines if it does not exceed five percent of their value of imports.  Non-bound tariff are bound 
by adding 25 percentage points (mark up) to the MFN rate. The so-called Paragraph 6 countries and 
small vulnerable countries are not required to make any reductions in their applied tariffs but have 
to bind all their tariffs so that the simple average of all NAMA tariff lines do not exceed 
respectively 28.5 and 22 percent on average. LDCs are not required to do anything by way of 
reform themselves, but gain duty-free access into developed countries markets for non-agricultural 
products.7 
 
The scenario is detailed below: 
 
 
• Least developed countries : LDCs are exempt from making any commitments.  
 
• Paragraph 6 countries: Countries with less than 35 percent binding coverage are exempt from 
making tariff reductions through the Swiss formula. They are, however, expected to bind 95 
percent of non-agricultural tariff lines at an average level that does not exceed the overall 
                                                 
7 Most LDCs already effectively have this quota- and duty-free access into the EU under the Everything But Arms 
(EBA) agreement (except for rice and sugar), and most African countries have similar preferential access into the US 
under AGOA. 
average of bound tariffs for all developing countries after full implementation of current 
concessions. This level is calculated as 28.5 percent. 
 
• Small vulnerable economies: These countries are exempt from making tariff reductions 
through the Swiss formula, although they must bind 95 percent of non-agricultural tariff lines 
at an average level that does not exceed 22 percent. 
 
• Newly acceded members and developing countries:  These implement the Swiss formula with 
a coefficient value of 20.  They do, however, have the flexibility of retaining unbound tariffs 
or formula cut exemptions for up to 5 percent of all lines, as long as the lines do not exceed 5 
percent of the member’s total import value.  
 
• Developed countries: These countries implement the Swiss formula with a coefficient of 5 
and they must grant duty-free and quota-free market access for non-agricultural products 
originating from LDCs. 
 
The general instrument for specifying tariff reduction commitments is the so-called simple Swiss 
formula, defined as:  
 
0
0
1  b)or (a 
 b)or (a 
t
t
t +
×=  
 
where, 
   
t1 = Final bound tariff 
t0 =  Base rate  
a =  Coefficient for developed Members (= 8) 
b =  Coefficient for developing Members subject to the formula (= 20) 
 
The base rate is given as the current bound rate or, in the case of unbound tariff lines, the MFN rate 
plus a constant mark-up of 25 percentage points. The Swiss formula is constructed in such a way 
that the highest tariffs are reduced the most, thus eliminating tariff peaks. Also, the final bound 
tariffs will be no higher than the coefficient used in the formula, i.e. 25 percent for developing and 8 
percent for developed countries.  
 
 
Implementing the scenarios  
To implement the Doha analysis, we use tariff data for the year 2001, obtained from the MAcMap 
database. This is the same data used in the GTAP database and our tariff calculations are therefore 
directly compatible with standard GTAP tariff data.8 The NAMA product coverage follows the 
chairman’s proposal for an agreed list of Non-Agricultural products in the HS6 (2002 revision) 
nomenclature (WTO 2006b) where we make the assumption that products not on this list fall under 
agriculture 
 
                                                 
8 In order to avoid a “mis-marriage” of data with our calculated shocks to the data base, we have first aggregated the 
MAcMAP database up to GTAP concordance without making any changes to the tariffs. We have then incorporated 
these tariffs into the initial GTAP data base before we began our update and NAMA reduction scenarios. 
For bound, MFN and applied tariffs, the MAcMap database reports ad valorem tariffs and ad 
valorem equivalents of specific tariffs. Ad valorem tariffs specify a duty as a percentage of the trade 
flow’s value. A specific tariff is expressed as a fixed amount per unit of import that has been 
converted into a value percentage using a unit value (the calculation of the ad valorem equivalents 
was done by CEPII when compiling the MacMap database). The total ad valorem equivalent (AVE) 
tariff applied to a given trade flow is thus the corresponding ad valorem and AVE specific tariff 
added together. 
 
In order to analyse the economic consequences of the Doha trade reform, we need to calculate how 
the reform changes applied tariffs. First, we apply the tiered/Swiss formula to pre-Doha bound ad 
valorem and AVE specific tariffs separately. The resulting post-Doha bound tariffs are compared to 
pre-Doha applied tariffs. Any applied ad valorem or specific tariff, which is higher than the 
corresponding post-Doha bound tariff, is reduced to this new bound level. In effect, we lower the 
tariff ceiling and cut off of all applied rates hitting the ceiling. Finally, we add applied ad valorem 
and AVE specific tariffs to obtain a total post-Doha AVE applied tariff.  
 
This general procedure is subject to a range of exceptions for certain countries as described above. 
 
 
Welfare effects of the Draft texts 
 
The real income generated globally as a consequence of the ordering of the international 
agricultural trade regime according to the Falconer Draft is estimated to increase by 4 billion US $ 
per year in 2001 prices, see table 3. Combined with the Stephenson Draft on NAMA the income 
gains increases to 52.5 billion US $. This income gain corresponds to an increase of about 0.1 % or 
about half the official development assistance provided by rich countries to the developing 
countries. 
 
The presently remaining significant barriers to international trade in agricultural products rest 
within the market access area. In fact, a World Bank study estimating the cost (or potential benefits) 
of present protectionist agricultural measures shows that 80 % of these costs are generated by 
market access restrictions. The provisions of the Falconer Draft regarding general tariff reductions 
are countered by the demands for exemptions for sensitive and special products. According to a 
study by the World Bank, exempting just 2 % of tariff lines from reduction by designating them as 
sensitive products would remove around 90 % of the benefits from market access liberalisation. In 
our model analysis 6-8 % of tariff lines are designated as sensitive as specified in the Falconer 
Draft. Furthermore, in all probability the products with the highest present tariffs in any given 
country are also eo ipso the most politically opportune to designate as sensitive implying only 
modest gains from liberalisation efforts in the market access area. Hence, the small number of only 
4 billion US $ in income gain is the outcome.9 This result is in the lower range since we have not 
                                                 
9 The detrimental effects of domestic support policies in developed countries have been reduced substantially through 
reform efforts already undertaken not least by the European Union. The former trade and production distorting support 
mechanisms in the EU have been converted into single farm payments, which have only minimal bearing upon the 
production decisions of the farmers. Furthermore, the world price weighing export subsidies have been all but 
eliminated both as a consequence of political decisions within the European Community, from which by far the major 
export subsidies derived until recently, a promise to eliminate them entirely by 2015 and perhaps more importantly the 
quite dramatic increases in world prices on agricultural products thereby removing the causes for the subsidies. The 
only remaining significant contribution to domestic support reduction could possibly come from the US, contingent 
upon the Farm Bill 2008 outcome. 
modelled tariff escalation and tariff rate quotas, which should conceivably compensate to some 
extent for sensitive products. 
 
The increases advances in income generation generated by the two Draft tests are not evenly 
distributed among the regions in the world. The United States barely achieves a positive growth in 
gdp and the EU will only experience modest gains. On the other hand, Africa and in particular Latin 
America are expected to secure the largest increases in gdp. In terms of total welfare the United 
States experiences a fall of 1.2 billion US $, which is due to a deterioration of the US terms of trade 
conditions resulting from market access liberalisations. This decline in terms of trade is fairly 
evenly distributed among agricultural products and non-agricultural product with a slightly more 
worsening of the former product group. 
 
Abolishment of export subsidies in developed countries lead to higher food prices for the net food 
importing African continent, a worsening of the terms of trade, however, this deterioration is more 
than outweighed by efficiency gains and increased capital accumulation resulting from better 
market access for particularly non-agricultural products. Thus, Africa as a whole achieves a welfare 
increase of about 1.8 billion US $. Likewise, the fast growing economies of China, India and Brazil 
along with most other developing countries gain primarily on better market access for non-
agricultural products. 
 
The European Union also gains on improved NAMA conditions and removal of export subsidies 
although the market access liberalisations for agricultural products reduce EU welfare, see table 2. 
Nevertheless, an increase of 6.9 billion US $ in total welfare for the EU is the predicted outcome of 
the Agricultural and the NAMA Drafts. Specifically, the gains accrue from efficiency 
improvements with some derived from capital accumulation. The terms of trade effect is, however, 
negative for the EU caused by lowering of import barriers on agricultural products. Consequently, 
the EU as a whole experiences a decline in welfare resulting from the more open agricultural 
domestic market. However, this decline is far exceeded by the gains from improved access for EU 
non-agricultural products. Likewise, the abolishment of export subsidies benefits European 
taxpayers. The overall increase in welfare is quite heterogeneously distributed among the EU 
member countries. Recently acceded EU members generally lose or break even, whereas Italy, UK, 
France and also Denmark are the biggest winners. Again, the improved NAMA access accounts for 
the welfare gains except for Denmark, which wins on both NAMA and on Agriculture and even 
wins considerably more on the latter. Actually, Denmark by far receives the biggest benefits of EU 
countries from the opening up of agricultural markets although the numbers are not particularly 
high. 
 
In total, the World generates 52.5 billion US $ more welfare as a consequence of the Falconer and 
Stephenson Drafts provisions. By far, the highest contribution is derived from the NAMA 
liberalisations. Divided into economic effects the welfare improvement is distributed fairly evenly 
between efficiency gains and increases in capital accumulation, whereas the terms of trade effects 
on the global level averages out. 
 
Turning to the contributions from specific products table 4 displays the effect on welfare from both 
agricultural and non-agricultural commodities. Agricultural products provide only app. 4 billion US 
$ to global welfare. Oil seeds benefits most from the provisions in the Falconer Draft, but also 
Sugar and Bovine meat gains. These product categories are some of the most regulated in the 
present agricultural trade regime, wherefore the partly liberalisation of these distortionary policies 
benefits the economies. The oil seed benefits accrue almost entirely to Asia,  
 
Perhaps a bit peculiar, wheat contributes negatively to the global welfare. However, this outcome 
can be referred almost entirely to a drastic increase in wheat exports from Mexico to Switzerland in 
the model10. 
 
The major benefits of lower tariffs in the international trade arena, although not necessarily less 
regulated, derives from the non-agricultural products. Particularly, the more manufactured items 
such as textile, machinery, electronics, etc. benefits, whereas natural resources and goods with only 
a minimum of value added gains very little. This result reflects predominantly the fact that the 
NAMA part of the global economy is much larger than the agriculture part. Likewise, manufactured 
products make up a larger part of NAMA than low value added products. Furthermore, tariffs on 
manufactured products are generally higher than on low value added products leading to larger 
effects of percentage tariff reductions. Hence, the higher reductions on manufactures show up in the 
predicted contributions to global welfare. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 Switzerland has very high, probably prohibitive, tariffs on wheat, which are lowered according to the Falconer Draft. 
Because Mexico has some export to Switzerland, presumably through some form of tariff rate quota, these exports 
increase dramatically with the lowering of average tariffs on wheat in Switzerland, since tariff quotas are not explicitly 
represented in the model, even though the average tariffs are probably still prohibitive after the tariff reduction. Thus, 
this highlights the fact that the intricate and very detailed regulations and access barriers existing in many countries 
regarding agricultural products is difficult to capture completely in a single model. 
Table 2. Impacts of the Falconer Draft: Sector and Macroeconomic indicators, EU 27 
   ----------------- of Total welfare ----------------- ----------------- of Total welfare ----------------- 
 
GDP growth Total 
welfare 
Export 
subsidy 
abolishment 
Agricultural 
Market 
access 
Non-
Agricultural 
Market 
access 
Allocative 
efficiency 
Capital 
Accumulation 
Terms of 
Trade 
 % --------------------------------------------------------- Million 2001 US $ --------------------------------------------------------- 
Belgium/Luxembourg 0.17 120 15 -33 138 313 116 -308 
Denmark 0.27 727 27 523 177 220 179 329 
Germany 0.05 451 238 -582 795 674 133 -356 
Greece 0.12 101 17 55 29 204 -11 -92 
Spain 0.09 378 94 -611 894 357 212 -191 
France 0.08 1,028 179 -746 1,595 681 374 -28 
Ireland 0.24 326 83 -8 251 191 122 14 
Italy 0.14 1,344 203 -509 1,650 729 708 -93 
Netherlands 0.13 486 63 234 189 473 60 -47 
Austria 0.20 318 38 45 235 165 180 -27 
Portugal -0.01 -104 10 18 -132 40 -29 -115 
Finland 0.18 238 49 23 166 143 86 10 
Sweden 0.12 384 53 91 240 155 94 135 
United Kingdom 0.10 1,231 100 84 1,046 1,094 379 -243 
Bulgaria 0.21 112 126 6 -20 98 -22 37 
Cyprus/Malta 0.53 82 54 15 13 57 17 9 
Czech Republic -0.04 -53 36 -47 -42 91 -82 -62 
Hungary -0.02 -55 53 -62 -47 40 -39 -56 
Poland 0.02 -61 93 -192 38 177 -102 -136 
Romania -0.27 -163 3 -19 -147 39 -107 -95 
Slovakia -0.10 -34 11 -14 -31 10 -25 -20 
Slovenia 0.18 60 78 -25 6 96 -37 0 
Estonia 0.01 4 19 -12 -3 19 -13 -1 
Latvia 0.09 10 1 7 2 19 -6 -3 
Lithuania -0.47 -71 -32 -13 -26 6 -70 -6 
EU 27 - 6,857 1,611 -1,770 7,016 6,088 2,117 -1,347 
Source: Simulation results 
               Allocative efficiency shows the gains from reallocating resources from protected sectors to more competitive ones 
               Capital accumulation shows the dynamic gains until 2015 though investments generated by the Draft proposals 
               Terms of trade shows the effects of the changes to a countries’ import prices relative to the countries’ export prices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Impacts of the Falconer Draft: Sector and Macroeconomic indicators, Other Regions 
   ----------------- of Total welfare ----------------- ----------------- of Total welfare ----------------- 
 
GDP growth Total 
welfare 
Export 
subsidy 
abolishment 
Agricultural 
Market 
access 
Non-
Agricultural 
Market 
access 
Allocative 
efficiency 
Capital 
Accumulation 
Terms of 
Trade 
 % --------------------------------------------------------- Million 2001 US $ --------------------------------------------------------- 
Egypt 0.80 609 -28 53 584 351 596 -338 
Uganda -0.01 -6 -1 -7 1 -1 0 -5 
South Africa 0.17 224 20 -34 239 139 64 21 
Rest of Africa 0.21 930 -362 623 670 602 284 45 
Africa, total - 1,757 -371 635 1,494 1,091 943 -277 
Mexico 0.87 5,358 -353 -1,865 7,576 3,404 2,580 -626 
Brazil 0.45 2,566 127 690 1,749 993 1,300 273 
Argentina 0.26 793 85 -10 718 292 426 75 
Rest of Latin America 0.24 2,086 -131 58 2,159 499 1,004 582 
Latin America, total - 10,803 -271 -1,128 12,202 5,188 5,311 304 
China 0.31 7,900 -49 78 7,870 2,152 4,259 1,488 
India 0.28 2,134 -2 416 1,720 869 1,425 -160 
Rest of Asia 0.30 18,411 -272 4,491 14,193 9,101 6,761 2,549 
United States 0.02 -1,203 565 -1,030 -739 656 1,405 -3,264 
Canada 0.08 529 179 54 296 369 208 -48 
Rest of World 0.18 5,277 -713 1,516 4,474 2,443 2,093 741 
Other countries, total 
(Rest of world + Canada) - 5,806 -534 1,570 4,770 2,812 2,301 693 
EU 27 - 6,857 1,611 -1,770 7,016 6,088 2,117 -1,347 
Total World - 52,464 677 3,262 48,525 27,957 24,522 -15 
Source: Simulation results 
               Allocative efficiency shows the gains from reallocating resources from protected sectors to more competitive ones 
               Capital accumulation shows the dynamic gains until 2015 though investments generated by the Draft proposals 
               Terms of trade shows the effects of the changes to a countries’ import prices relative to the countries’ export prices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Contributions from reducing export subsidies and tariffs to the Global welfare by 
commodity (million 2001 US$) 
Product Global EV 
Rice 102 
Wheat -1,020 
Other cereals -143 
Vegetables, fruit and nuts 409 
Oil seeds 1,917 
Sugar cane beet 2 
Plant based fibers -17 
Crops n.e.c. 327 
Bovine Cattle, sheep, goats, horses -49 
Animal products n.e.c. -258 
Milk 0 
Wool and silk -4 
Bovine meat products 1,256 
Other meat products -152 
Vegetable oils and fats -158 
Dairy products 777 
Processed rice 847 
Sugar 1,178 
Food products n.e.c. -269 
Beverages and tobacco products -806 
Total agriculture 3,939 
  
Natural resources 540 
Textiles 5,611 
Wearing apparel 5,846 
Leather products 3,793 
Wood products 516 
Paper products published 76 
Petroleum, coal products 54 
Chemical, rubber, plastic products 2,455 
Mineral products n.e.c. 887 
Ferrous metals 2,113 
Metals n.e.c. 421 
Metal products 1,732 
Motor vehicles and parts 6,419 
Transport equipment n.e.c. 1,919 
Electronic equipment 4,356 
Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 10,167 
Manufactures n.e.c 1,622 
Total NAMA 48,525 
  
Total, Agriculture plus NAMA 52,464 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
